1965 Sovyet ekonomik reformu Kosıgin reformu Rusça Косыгинская реформа veya Liberman reformu Sovyetl

1965 Sovyet ekonomik reformu, Kosıgin reformu (Rusça: Косыгинская реформа) veya Liberman reformu, Sovyetler Birliği ekonomisinde planlanan bir dizi değişikliği içeren reform. Bu değişikliklerin merkezinde, kârlılığın ve satışların kurumsal başarının iki önemli göstergesi olarak tanıtılması oldu. Bir işletmenin kârının bir kısmı, çalışanları ödüllendirmek ve üretimlerini genişletmek için kullanılan üç fona gidecekti, öncesinde çoğu merkezi bütçeye gitmekte idi.

Reformlar Aleksey Kosıgin tarafından tanıtıldı ve Merkez Komitesi tarafından Eylül 1965'te yürürlüğe konuldu. Sovyetler Birliği'nin matematik yönelimli ekonomik planlamacılarının uzun zamandır süregelen isteklerini yansıttılar ve merkezi olmayan bir ekonomik planlama sürecine doğru kaymaya başladılar.

Arka plan

Lenin'e göre, Yeni Ekonomi Politikası Sovyet ekonomisinin düzenlenmesi için kar ve teşvik kavramlarına izin vermiş ve kullanmıştı. Stalin, "Beş Yıllık Planlar" ile örneklendiği gibi, bu politikayı çiftliklerin kollektifleşmesi ve sanayinin ulusallaştırılması ile merkezi planlamanın hızlandırılmasıyla hızla değiştirdi. 1930'dan bu yana Sovyetler Birliği ekonomisini yönetmek için merkezi bir sistem kullanmıştı. Bu sistem, işçilerin işlere atanmasına, ücretlerin belirlenmesine, kaynak tahsisinin belirlenmesine, diğer ülkelerle ticaret seviyelerinin belirlenmesine ve teknolojik ilerlemenin seyrinin planlanmasına neden olan ekonomik planlar yarattı. Tüketici malları için perakende fiyatları, piyasayı temizlemeye yönelik seviyelerde sabitlendi. Toptan eşya fiyatları da sabitlendi, ancak bunlar bir piyasa mekanizmasından çok bir muhasebe işlevi gördü. Kolektif çiftlikler aynı zamanda ihtiyaç duydukları malzemeler için merkezi olarak belirlenen fiyatları ödediler ve diğer sektörlerden farklı olarak, çalışanları doğrudan üretimin karlılığına bağlı ücretler aldı.

Her ne kadar Sovyet girişimleri teorik olarak girdi ve çıktıları için belirlenen fiyatlar sistemi içinde planlamacıların beklentilerini karşılamalarını gerektiren khozraschet ("hesap verebilirlik") ilkesiyle yönetilse de, üretimlerini etkileyen en büyük kararlar üzerinde çok az kontrolleri oldu. Yöneticiler, daha sonradan tahminleri aşmak için kronik olarak hafife alınan gelecekteki brüt çıktıları planlama sorumluluğuna sahipti. Sistem, aynı zamanda 'daha fazla' üretildiği için üretim çıktılarının büyüklüğü, ağırlığı ve maliyeti anlamsız artışları teşvik etti.

Optimal planlayıcıların yükselişi

Ekonomik reformlar, ekonomik planlama konusundaki büyük ideolojik tartışma döneminde ortaya çıktı. Daha matematiksel, "sibernetik" bakış açıları ilk başta ortodoks Marksist iktisattan sapkın olarak kabul edildi; bu tartışmalarda gelirin kesinlikle emekten elde edilmesinin değerini ortaya koydu. Stalin'in 1952 tarihli kitabı, SSCB'de Sosyalizmin Ekonomik Sorunları adlı kitabında yer alan bu doktrin, fiyat sistemini nihayetinde komünist toplumdan kaybolacak kapitalist bir kalıntı olarak nitelendirdi.

Bununla birlikte, geleneksel Marksist-Leninist politik ekonomi çoğu okulda okutulmuş ve kamu tüketimine teşvik edilmiş olsa da, bilgisayarlı ekonomi en iyi planlamacılar için önemli bir rol üstlenmiştir. Sovyet ekonomisinde istatistiksel planlamanın yükselen etkisi Merkezi Ekonomik Matematik Enstitüsü'nün oluşturulmasına yansıdı. Vasili Nemçinov, doğrusal programlama mucidi Leonid Kantoroviç ve yatırım analisti Viktor Novozhilov ile birlikte 1965'te Lenin Ödülü'nü aldı. "Optimal" planlama ve kongre planlaması arasındaki fikirsel savaş 1960'larda sürdü.

Ekonomik planlamadaki bir başka eğilim, “işlemin normatif değerini” veya üretimin değerini değerlendirmede ihtiyaç ve isteklerin önemini vurgulamaktadır.

Kosıgin ve Brejnev'in yükselişi

Sovyet dünyasındaki büyük değişiklikler 1964 yılında Nikita Kruşçevin uzaklaştırılması Aleksey Kosıgin ve Leonid Brejnev'in yükselişi ile mümkün oldu. Ekonomik politika, Sovyet basınındaki Kruşçev karşıtı eleştirinin önemli bir retrospektif alanıydı. Sovyetler Birliği'ndeki bu 'reformist' ekonomik eğilimin Doğu Avrupa’da ortak güçlükleri ve bazı destekleri oldu.

Kosıgin, önceki yönetim altındaki ekonomi politikasının yetersizliğini ve ataletini eleştirdi. O Komünist Parti için, Liberman ve Nemçinov tarafından ifade fikirler içeren bir planı Eylül 1965'te Merkez Komitesi'ne sundu. Merkez Komite'nin reform planını kabul etmesi, bu fikirlerin teoriden eyleme geçişinde önemli bir kilometre taşı oldu.

Sonuçları

1969'da Tolyatti'deki yeni AvtoVAZ tesisinde bir araç üzerinde çalışan işçi.

Ekonomi 1966-1970’te 1961-1965’te olduğundan daha fazla büyüdü Birçok işletme fazla ekipman satmaya veya vermeye teşvik edildi, çünkü mevcut tüm sermaye verimlilik hesaplamasına dahil edildi. Bazı verimlilik ölçümleri iyileştirildi. Bunlar arasında, sermaye ruble başına düşen satışlar ve satış ruble başına düşen ücretler yer aldı. İşletmeler, kârlarının büyük bölümünü, bazen %80'ini merkezi bütçeye kazandırdılar. Bu "ücretsiz" kalan kar ödemeleri, esasen sermaye giderlerini aşmıştır.

Ancak, merkezi planlamacılar reformun etkisinden memnun değildi. Özellikle, ücretlerin verimlilikte orantılı bir artış olmadan arttığını gözlemlediler. Özel değişikliklerin çoğu, 1969-1971 yılları arasında revize edildi veya geri alındı.

Reformlar, partinin mikro-ekonomik işlemlerde yönetimindeki üstünlüğü biraz azalttı. Ekonomik reformizme karşı verilen tepki, 1968’de Çekoslovakya’ya müdaheleyi tamamen tetikleyen siyasi liberalleşmeye muhalefetle birleşti.

Ayrıca bakınız

1979 Sovyet ekonomik reformu

Kaynakça

Özel;

^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), pp. 8–17.
^ Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), pp. 5–11.
^ Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), pp. 11–13.
^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 155. "The old-style director who was good at obtaining materials in short supply and fighting successfully with the authorities to get a low 'val' plan that he could comfortably overfill was lost in the new circumstances, and there was a serious problem of psychological reorientation."
^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 22–27. "The amount of premia was determined on the basis of the fulfillment of the norms for each plan index, and a certain rate was established for fulfillment and higher rates for overfulfillment of each norm. Since gross output was considered the most important index by the leadership, it carried with it the highest rates. The manipulation of these bonuses was very important because management personnel oriented production to get the most favorable sums, especially since the premia often amounted to a sum equal to the manager's regular salary. Moreover, whereas bonuses for workers and lower management personnel, e.g., a shop chief, were paid out of the enterprise fund made up of a part of the enterprise profit, the bonuses of the managerial personnel were, for the most part, paid out of the State budget. Thus, the premia of the manager and his staff came from fulfilling the production plan regardless of how the enterprise did financially."
^ Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 4.
^ Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 30. "In Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (1952) Stalin repeated the familiar Maxist–Leninist argument that price-market relationships in a socialist economy are a relic of capitalism, the persistence of which in a socialist economy is due to the existence side by side with the socialist sector of a cooperative sector (the collective farms), and that these price-market relationships are destined to wither away under communism."
^ Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 11. "Political economy is discussed in the press, lectures are given on it in the factories, and it is taught to students throughout the higher educational system. Economic cybernetics is a specialized academic discipline which is taught to future planners."
^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 199. "The mathematical school represents a major breakthrough in the approach to price formation and resource allocation, even though its exponents--to a larger or smaller degree--are cautious in advocating an immediate radical overhaul of the present system."
^ Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 2.
^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), pp. 197–198. "The impact of the mathematical economists is evident from the growing recognition and honors bestowed on them. In 1964 Kantorovich was promoted to the rank of Academician, and in 1965 the Lenin Prize was awarded to Kantorovich, Nemchinov, and Novozhilov for their pioneering work in planometrics. Even though, as can be expected, there were discordant voices among the economic fraternity, the mathematical school is gaining respectability by claiming the Soviet priority in input-output and linear programming."
^ Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), pp. 11–12.
^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 85–86.
^ Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 23–24.
^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 105. "It was clear from the context of the articles that economic policy was a major, if not the major, area for condemnation of the deposed leader, and the three major subdivisions of the criticism were the issue of resource allocations, the successive reorganizations, and the mess in agriculture."
^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 256. "Undoubtedly one of the major reasons for Khrushchev's ouster on October 15, 1964, was the state of the economy and his erratic handling of the situation."
^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 123. "Throughout this period, there were numerous published reports concerning other Eastern European reforms in the Soviet press and journals, which undoubtedly served the purpose of propagandizing and stimulating the reform movement. [...] In addition to publicizing their efforts at reform, the Soviet leaders were actively engaged in discussion with the Eastern European regimes and actually had something to learn from their junior partners in the matter of reform."
^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 257. "In his report of December 9, 1969, to the Supreme Soviet, Kosygin assaulted the inefficiency of the planning system. He welt on the misuse of investment resources, the protracted construction periods and underestimated costs [...]. He condemned the enterprise's unwillingness and inertia in introducing technical progress and accentuated the inferior output quality. He pointed to the endless links in the chain of command, the superimposition of strata in administration, the muddle created by duplication of work in many agencies, and the ever growing mutual coordination, often responsible for delaying solutions to arising problems."
^ Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 40.
^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), p. 110. "The September, 1965 plenum thus acts as a bridge between the reform debate of 1962–1965 and the actual instillation of the reform in the Soviet economy. In the case of the former, the Plenum represents the culmination of the debate with the Soviet leadership announcing which of the ideas and proposals of the reformers it found to be the most valid and compelling; in the case of the latter, the Plenum laid out the path which the infusion of reform proposals was to take."
^ ^a ^b Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 53. "The economy did not perform well enough to impress opponents of the reform. It grew faster in 1966–1970 than it did in 1961–1965. Its development, however, showed some disquieting phenomena; primarily the relationship between wages and productivity in industry was not to the liking of the central planners. Nominal (and real wages) [sic] grew fast, but productivity lagged behind the target."
^ Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 139. "The new system is considered to have had a number of positive allocation effects. It has led to widespread selling, or giving way, of superfluous equipment. (This increases both the PDF and, ceteris paribus, profitability.) In addition the reform has had a positive effect on a number of indices which are conventionally regarded as measures of efficiency. The head of Gosplan's department for the introduction of the new system has cited table 8.4, which refers to 580 enterprises transferred to the new system in 1966, to illustrate the positive effect of the reform on efficiency."
^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), p. 142.
^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), pp. 327, 341, 377–383.
^ Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 52–53. "However, the reform was short-lived. Some of its building blocks started to crumble when it was still expanding to other areas. In 1969 productivity targets were reintroduced; what is worse, the most important element—a new approach to the formation of the bonus fund—was dropped. Starting in 1972 the bonus fund was again assigned to enterprises from above, and the fund creating indicators, sales and profit, were reduced to corrective indicators (Adam, 1980). The number of success indicators started to grow again. Decentralised investment, for reasons already mentioned, played a minimal role."
^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 173. "It is clear that, in general, the pendulum again shifted to a stress on staying out of day-to-day management problems, however. Thus, in September, 1966, Pravda concluded that party organs in the Perm oblast were relying on 'administrative methods' or were caught up in 'paper creativity.'"
^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), pp. 180–181. "This development appears to have paralleled the general conservative tightening-up in other spheres of Soviet life, especially those of culture and ideology, which was at least partially related to the development of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia. With the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the conservative backlash reached its high point and the economic reformist notions of that country came under such heavy attack as to strike caution into economic reformers elsewhere in the Soviet bloc."

Genel;

Adam, Jan. Economic Reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since the 1960s. Hong Kong: Macmillan Press, 1989.
Ellman, Michael. Soviet Planning Today: Proposals for an Optimally Functioning Economic System. University of Cambridge Department of Applied Economics, Occasional Paper 25. Cambridge University Press, 1971.
Feiwel, George R. The Soviet Quest for Economic Efficiency: Issues, Controversies, and Reforms: Expanded and Updated Edition. New York: Praeger, 1972.
Katz, Abraham. The Politics of Economic Reform in the Soviet Union. New York: Praeger, 1972.
Tubis, Richard Irving. Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy: Administrative Implementation of the 1965 Economic Reform. Political science dissertation accepted at University of Illinois, Urbana–Champaign, August 1973.

[1] Katz, Economic Reform (1972), pp. 8–17.

[2] Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), pp. 5–11.

[3] Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), pp. 11–13.

[Katz1972p155-4] Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 155. "The old-style director who was good at obtaining materials in short supply and fighting successfully with the authorities to get a low 'val' plan that he could comfortably overfill was lost in the new circumstances, and there was a serious problem of psychological reorientation."

[5] Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 22–27. "The amount of premia was determined on the basis of the fulfillment of the norms for each plan index, and a certain rate was established for fulfillment and higher rates for overfulfillment of each norm. Since gross output was considered the most important index by the leadership, it carried with it the highest rates. The manipulation of these bonuses was very important because management personnel oriented production to get the most favorable sums, especially since the premia often amounted to a sum equal to the manager's regular salary. Moreover, whereas bonuses for workers and lower management personnel, e.g., a shop chief, were paid out of the enterprise fund made up of a part of the enterprise profit, the bonuses of the managerial personnel were, for the most part, paid out of the State budget. Thus, the premia of the manager and his staff came from fulfilling the production plan regardless of how the enterprise did financially."

[6] Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 4.

[7] Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 30. "In Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (1952) Stalin repeated the familiar Maxist–Leninist argument that price-market relationships in a socialist economy are a relic of capitalism, the persistence of which in a socialist economy is due to the existence side by side with the socialist sector of a cooperative sector (the collective farms), and that these price-market relationships are destined to wither away under communism."

[8] Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 11. "Political economy is discussed in the press, lectures are given on it in the factories, and it is taught to students throughout the higher educational system. Economic cybernetics is a specialized academic discipline which is taught to future planners."

[9] Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 199. "The mathematical school represents a major breakthrough in the approach to price formation and resource allocation, even though its exponents--to a larger or smaller degree--are cautious in advocating an immediate radical overhaul of the present system."

[10] Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 2.

[11] Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), pp. 197–198. "The impact of the mathematical economists is evident from the growing recognition and honors bestowed on them. In 1964 Kantorovich was promoted to the rank of Academician, and in 1965 the Lenin Prize was awarded to Kantorovich, Nemchinov, and Novozhilov for their pioneering work in planometrics. Even though, as can be expected, there were discordant voices among the economic fraternity, the mathematical school is gaining respectability by claiming the Soviet priority in input-output and linear programming."

[12] Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), pp. 11–12.

[13] Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 85–86.

[Adam23-14] Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 23–24.

[15] Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 105. "It was clear from the context of the articles that economic policy was a major, if not the major, area for condemnation of the deposed leader, and the three major subdivisions of the criticism were the issue of resource allocations, the successive reorganizations, and the mess in agriculture."

[16] Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 256. "Undoubtedly one of the major reasons for Khrushchev's ouster on October 15, 1964, was the state of the economy and his erratic handling of the situation."

[17] Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 123. "Throughout this period, there were numerous published reports concerning other Eastern European reforms in the Soviet press and journals, which undoubtedly served the purpose of propagandizing and stimulating the reform movement. [...] In addition to publicizing their efforts at reform, the Soviet leaders were actively engaged in discussion with the Eastern European regimes and actually had something to learn from their junior partners in the matter of reform."

[18] Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 257. "In his report of December 9, 1969, to the Supreme Soviet, Kosygin assaulted the inefficiency of the planning system. He welt on the misuse of investment resources, the protracted construction periods and underestimated costs [...]. He condemned the enterprise's unwillingness and inertia in introducing technical progress and accentuated the inferior output quality. He pointed to the endless links in the chain of command, the superimposition of strata in administration, the muddle created by duplication of work in many agencies, and the ever growing mutual coordination, often responsible for delaying solutions to arising problems."

[Adam40-19] Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 40.

[20] Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), p. 110. "The September, 1965 plenum thus acts as a bridge between the reform debate of 1962–1965 and the actual instillation of the reform in the Soviet economy. In the case of the former, the Plenum represents the culmination of the debate with the Soviet leadership announcing which of the ideas and proposals of the reformers it found to be the most valid and compelling; in the case of the latter, the Plenum laid out the path which the infusion of reform proposals was to take."

[Adam53-21] Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 53. "The economy did not perform well enough to impress opponents of the reform. It grew faster in 1966–1970 than it did in 1961–1965. Its development, however, showed some disquieting phenomena; primarily the relationship between wages and productivity in industry was not to the liking of the central planners. Nominal (and real wages) [sic] grew fast, but productivity lagged behind the target."

[22] Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 139. "The new system is considered to have had a number of positive allocation effects. It has led to widespread selling, or giving way, of superfluous equipment. (This increases both the PDF and, ceteris paribus, profitability.) In addition the reform has had a positive effect on a number of indices which are conventionally regarded as measures of efficiency. The head of Gosplan's department for the introduction of the new system has cited table 8.4, which refers to 580 enterprises transferred to the new system in 1966, to illustrate the positive effect of the reform on efficiency."

[23] Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), p. 142.

[24] Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), pp. 327, 341, 377–383.

[25] Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 52–53. "However, the reform was short-lived. Some of its building blocks started to crumble when it was still expanding to other areas. In 1969 productivity targets were reintroduced; what is worse, the most important element—a new approach to the formation of the bonus fund—was dropped. Starting in 1972 the bonus fund was again assigned to enterprises from above, and the fund creating indicators, sales and profit, were reduced to corrective indicators (Adam, 1980). The number of success indicators started to grow again. Decentralised investment, for reasons already mentioned, played a minimal role."

[Katz1972Partypower-26] Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 173. "It is clear that, in general, the pendulum again shifted to a stress on staying out of day-to-day management problems, however. Thus, in September, 1966, Pravda concluded that party organs in the Perm oblast were relying on 'administrative methods' or were caught up in 'paper creativity.'"

[27] Katz, Economic Reform (1972), pp. 180–181. "This development appears to have paralleled the general conservative tightening-up in other spheres of Soviet life, especially those of culture and ideology, which was at least partially related to the development of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia. With the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the conservative backlash reached its high point and the economic reformist notions of that country came under such heavy attack as to strike caution into economic reformers elsewhere in the Soviet bloc."